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CIVIL LIABILITY FOR MISSTATEMENTS IN OFFER 
DOCUMENTS: STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE 
Joanna Khoo 
ABSTRACT 
In recent times, increased scrutiny has been placed on information in 
financial products provided to the public. As financial products are not 
physical goods, members of the public must read offer documents in 
order to assess the financial product. The accuracy of these offer 
documents therefore becomes crucial. 
This Article conducts a comparative analysis of the imposition of 
civil liability for misstatements in offer documents in the United 
Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand—the objective being to determine 
whether the statutory regime in each of the countries effectively provides 
an adequate level of investor protection. In the process, a number of 
design issues are identified and some suggestions are made as to how 
those issues could be addressed. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of the global financial crisis and its uncertain aftermath, 
increased scrutiny is being placed on the information the public receives 
about financial products. To provide the right level of investor 
protection, a delicate balance must exist between the marketing of a 
financial product and the requirement to provide objective information to 
potential investors. 
Financial products are different from other products usually 
purchased by consumers in that investors in financial products are not 
able to physically see what they have purchased. Instead, investors are 
offered documents to determine if a given product meets their needs. 
Investors, as the term suggests, invest in financial products with an 
expectation of a return. When the expected return is not realized, 
however, investors may not necessarily be able to return the product in 
the way that consumers can return faulty tangible goods. 
In order to ensure that investors are not misled into purchasing a 
faulty financial product, securities laws and regulations have been 
developed to ensure that statements made by issuers of securities are true 
and do not mislead investors, either by including misstatements or by 
leaving out important information.1 Sanctions for misstatements are 
imposed on a range of people involved in producing offer documents. 
These sanctions are available not only for common law 
misrepresentations, but also for broader problems. 
Protections for the investor, however, must be balanced with the 
needs and incentives of the issuer. The severity of sanctions has to be 
balanced with ensuring that issuers are not unduly restricted in their 
conduct, as excessive regulation and sanctions could result in less 
informative and timely disclosure. This can drive issuers away from 
capital markets offerings and toward other financing alternatives, since 
conforming with regulations costs issuers money and time, which can 
make the endeavour less profitable, and thus less likely to be engaged 
in.2 This in turn may result in fewer available investor choices, or even 
adverse selection because high quality issuers typically have a wide 
range of financing options available to them. A stringent civil liability 
 
 1. Jonathan Lindroos & Gordon Walker, A Short History of Securities Regulation in New 
Zealand, in SECURITIES REGULATION IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND 59–89 (Gordon Walker & 
Brent Fisse eds., 1994). 
 2. EILÍS FERRAN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE LAW 62 (2008) [hereinafter FERRAN, 
PRINCIPLES]. 
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regime could also lead to excessive litigation, which is not welcome in 
many countries outside the United States.3 
Two factors are vital to an effective civil liability regime: (1) the 
design of the legislative provisions that impose liability and (2) the 
stringency of the regulatory authority that enforces those provisions. The 
standard needed to reach a finding of liability is difficult to define and 
complicates the second prong of an effective civil liability regime. 
This Article compares the imposition of civil liability for 
misstatements in offer documents in the United Kingdom, Australia, and 
New Zealand. In the last decade, all three jurisdictions have reviewed 
and amended their securities legislation. The objective here is to 
determine whether the statutory regime in each of the countries 
effectively addresses the two vital factors and provides an adequate level 
of investor protection. In the process, a number of design issues and 
possible solutions will be identified. 
Part Two of this Article provides an overview of the general 
requirements for disclosure and compares the requirements for imposing 
civil liability for misstatements in offer documents in each jurisdiction. It 
also discusses two issues in imposing civil liability: (1) the relevance of 
materiality, causation, and reliance and (2) the imposition of liability on 
the secondary market. Part Three of this Article compares persons that 
are held liable for misstatements in each jurisdiction, with particular 
emphasis on the liability of issuers and directors. Part Four considers 
whether the enforcement procedures in each of the jurisdictions work 
effectively to adequately police misstatements and to provide sufficient 
investor protection. 
Note that the legislation in all three jurisdictions distinguishes 
between omissions and inclusions. This is consistent with New 
Brunswick & Canada Railway Co v. Muggeridge, an early common law 
decision on liability for misstatements in prospectuses.4 Where the term 
“misstatement” is used in this Article, it broadly refers to both positive 
inclusions and omissions in offer documents. While the focus of this 
Article is on liability under securities legislation, relief also exists for 
investors outside the securities regime, such as under the torts of deceit 
or negligent misstatement, or under appropriate fair trading or trade 
 
 3. Peter Fitzsimons, “If the Truth be Known”: The Securities Act 1978 and Directors' 
Liability for Misstatements in a Prospectus (Part II) 6 N.Z. BUS. L.Q. 235, 256 (2000); see also Eilís 
Ferran, Are US-Style Investor Suits Coming to the UK?, Civil Enforcement in Securities Law 
Conference, Cambridge (2009) [hereinafter Ferran, US-Style Investor], available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1436333. 
 4. (1860) 1 Dr. & Sm. 363 (U.K.). 
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practices legislation. These remedies are not considered in this Article.5 
II. THE GENERAL REQUIREMENT FOR DISCLOSURE AND THE 
IMPOSITION OF CIVIL LIABILITY FOR MISSTATEMENTS 
An analysis of liability for misstatements in offer documents begins 
with the requirement of disclosure. Justice Brandeis famously said, 
“sunlight . . . is the best of disinfectants.”6 This mantra is often cited by 
disclosure proponents, and mandatory disclosure is now an entrenched 
viewpoint around the world in securities legislation.7 Disclosure-based 
regulation is widely regarded as the optimal policy, especially in 
developed securities markets such as the three analysed in this Article.8 
As the requirement to disclose information is necessarily linked to 
liability for misstatements made in the course of that disclosure, this 
Section discusses these two topics together for each of the three 
jurisdictions. A comparison and critique is then made of the treatment in 
each of the jurisdictions of these two topics. 
A. United Kingdom 
(1) General requirement for disclosure 
The requirement to fully disclose information when selling securities 
to the public developed in the late 19th century, when burgeoning 
industrial and speculative activity led to the advent of unscrupulous 
promoters selling securities on false grounds or without providing full 
facts.9 In response, the courts developed rules to ensure that persons who 
invite the public to purchase securities are “bound to state everything 
with strict and scrupulous accuracy”10 and with “the utmost candour and 
honesty.”11 
 
 5. Note that in New Zealand the fair trading legislation is subjugated to securities regulation 
in any case. See §63A of the New Zealand Securities Act (1978) and §19 of the Securities Markets 
Act (1988) (N.Z.). 
 6. LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY: AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 62 (1933). 
 7. John C. Coffee, Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure 
System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 721–23 (1984); see also Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory 
Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1339 
(1999). 
 8. S. M. Solaiman, Disclosure Philosophy for Investor Protection in Securities Markets: 
Does One Size Fit All?, 28(5) COMP. LAW.  135 (2007). 
 9. Peter Fitzsimons, “If the Truth be Known”: The Securities Act 1978 and Directors' 
Liability for Misstatements in a Prospectus, 5 N.Z. BUS. L.Q. 164, 165 (1999). 
 10. New Brunswick & Canada Ry. Co v. Muggeridge, (1860) 1 Dr. & Sm. 363, 381 (U.K.). 
 11. Central Ry. Co of Venezuela v. Kisch, (1867) L.R. 2 H.L. 99, 113 (U.K.). 
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In terms of liability for breach of disclosure obligations, the common 
law starting point is Derry v. Peek, in which the directors of a company 
seeking to raise capital made an honest but unreasonable statement in a 
prospectus that the company had authority to use steam power for its 
carriages.12 In fact, the authorization was conditioned on consent, and 
that consent was subsequently denied. The House of Lords held that the 
directors were not liable for damages as there was no proof of fraud—an 
honest belief on their part, though unreasonable, was insufficient for 
liability to attach as long as it did not reach the level of recklessness.13 
The case left a gap in investor protection for non-deceitful 
statements, which almost immediately led to statutory intervention in the 
United Kingdom. The Directors Liability Act of 1890 imposed liability 
for untrue statements in a prospectus, even if those statements were made 
in a careless belief that they were true.14 The underlying philosophy was 
that investors should be provided with sufficient information in order to 
enable them to make informed decisions, thereby protecting investors 
and preventing fraudulent enterprises.15 This early legislation effectively 
shifted the onus of proof under the common law of tort at that time.16 
Today, liability for misstatements in offer documents in the United 
Kingdom is governed by the Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000 
(U.K. Act). Sections 80 and 87A of the U.K. Act contain the general duty 
of disclosure in relation to listing particulars and prospectuses, 
respectively.17 For present purposes, it is sufficient to deal with the duty 
of disclosure with respect to prospectuses, which continue to be the 
principal means by which information is provided to investors.18 
Section 87A of the U.K. Act provides that prospectuses submitted to 
the Financial Services Authority (UKFSA) must contain the “necessary 
 
 12. (1889) L.R. 14 App. Cas, 337 (H.L.). 
 13. PAUL L. DAVIES, GOWER'S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 429 (6th ed., 1997). 
 14. PHILIP MITCHELL, TOLLEY'S DIRECTOR'S DUTIES 302 (2007). 
 15. DAVEY COMMITTEE, 1895, C. 7779, paras. 6, 28, quoted in ROMAN TOMASIC & STEPHEN 
BOTTOMLEY, CORPORATIONS LAW IN AUSTRALIA 556 (1995) and SECURITIES REGULATION IN 
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND 67 (Gordon Walker & Brent Fisse eds., 1994). 
 16. ALASTAIR HUDSON, SECURITIES LAW 584 (2008). It also marks the birth of the prospectus 
and forms the genesis of the core company laws today. 
 17. Broadly, a prospectus must be submitted with respect to securities which are to be offered 
to the public in the United Kingdom for the first time before admission, and listing particulars are 
required to be submitted in all other cases where the securities are being listed. See JONATHAN 
FISHER ET AL., THE LAW OF INVESTOR PROTECTION 124–25 (2003). 
 18. Section 81 of the U.K. Act provides that listing particulars are required to “contain all 
such information as investors and their professional advisers would reasonably require, and 
reasonably expect to find there, for the purpose of making an informed assessment” of the securities. 
This is a narrower requirement than that under section 87A, which makes no reference to 
professional advisers who would presumably possess greater financial knowledge and therefore 
require less information. 
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information.”19 The “necessary information” is that “information 
necessary to enable investors to make an informed assessment of the 
assets and liabilities, financial position, profits and losses, and prospects 
of the issuer . . . and the rights attaching to the securities.”20 This 
approach can be described as part prescriptive and part principle-based. 
While the legislation does not prescribe the exact information that is 
required to be included in the prospectus, reference to the issuer’s assets, 
liabilities, and financial position provides some context for the 
information that must be included. 
Only prospectuses that are being submitted to the UKFSA, which are 
for securities that are to be admitted to the official list or for trading on a 
regulated market, are required to comply with section 87A of the U.K. 
Act.21 Prospectuses for all other securities are governed by common 
law,22 which, as discussed above, requires disclosure of all relevant 
information.23 
(2) Imposition of civil liability for misstatements 
Section 90 of the U.K. Act imposes liability for misstatements or 
defects in a prospectus. As with section 87A of the U.K. Act, section 90 
applies only to a prospectus for securities that is to be admitted to the 
official list or for trading on a regulated market. Section 90(1), as 
amended by the Prospectus Regulations 2005 (amendments in 
brackets),24 provides: 
 
Any person responsible for listing particulars [or a prospectus] is 
liable to pay compensation to a person who has: 
a) acquired securities to which the particulars apply 
[or acquired transferable securities to which the 
prospectus applies]; and 
b) suffered loss in respect of them as a result of— 
(i) any untrue or misleading statement in the 
particulars [or the prospectus]; or 
(ii) the omission from the particulars [or the 
prospectus] of any matter required to be 
included by section 80 or 81 [or, in 
 
 19. Financial Services and Markets Act, § 87A(1)(b) (2000) (U.K.). 
 20. Id. § 87A(2). 
 21. HUDSON, supra note 16, at 347. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See supra notes 10 & 11 and accompanying text. 
 24. Prospectus Regulations 2005, § 6. 
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respect of prospectuses, section 87A or 
87G].25 
 
Section 90 of the U.K. Act therefore links an investor who has 
suffered a loss with the persons that are responsible for the preparation of 
offer documents, which under common law is not necessarily easy to 
prove, especially between arm’s length parties.26 This issue is discussed 
in further detail below.27 
B.  Australia 
(1) General requirement for disclosure 
Australia has a federal constitution, pursuant to which the central 
Commonwealth legislature and the six state legislatures have the power 
to make law on only a limited range of matters.28 Until the early 2000s 
Australia had a wholly state-based regulatory framework and did not 
have comprehensive national legislation for the securities industry.29 
Instead, the various states passed their own legislation, but in a uniform 
fashion.30 
Reform of Australian securities regulation began in the late 1990s, 
after the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP) conducted 
a review. The CLERP proposals culminated in the passing of the 
Corporations Act in 2001 (Aust. Act).31 The Aust. Act governs three 
types of disclosure documents: a prospectus, a profile statement, and an 
offer information statement.32 
The Aust. Act prescribes different levels of disclosure for different 
types of disclosure documents. For example, in relation to a full 
prospectus, section 710 of the Aust. Act requires the disclosure of “all 
the information that investors and their professional advisers would 
 
 25. Words in brackets denote amendments made by the Prospectus Regulations 2005. 
 26. HUDSON, supra note 16, at 572–73. Note, however, that Possfund Custodian Trustee Ltd 
v. Diamond [1996] 2 All. E.R. 774 may have changed this. 
 27. See infra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 28. ROBERT BAXT, CHRISTOPHER MAXWELL, & SELWYN BAJADA, STOCK MARKETS AND THE 
SECURITIES INDUSTRY: LAW AND PRACTICE 4 (3rd ed., 1989). 
 29. ROBERT BAXT, ASHLEY BLACK, & PAMELA HANRAHAN, SECURITIES AND FINANCIAL 
SERVICES LAW 30 (7th ed., 2008). 
 30. MARC STEINBERG, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW: A CONTEMPORARY AND 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 23 (1999). 
 31. BAXT, BLACK, & HANRAHAN, supra note 29, at 47. 
 32. Corporations Act, § 9 (2001) (Austl.). 
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reasonably require to make an informed assessment” of the securities.33 
This is an example of the principle-based approach, as issuers are left to 
determine, based on principle rather than a prescribed list, what 
information is reasonably required. 
(2) Imposition of civil liability for misstatements 
In Australia, liability can be imposed with respect to disclosure 
documents, regardless of which type of disclosure document is at issue. 
Section 728 of the Aust. Act provides: 
 
A person must not offer securities under a disclosure 
document if there is: 
a) a misleading or deceptive statement in: 
i. the disclosure document; . . . 
b) an omission from the disclosure document of 
material required by section 710, 711, 712, 713, 
714 or 715; or 
c) a new circumstance that: 
i. has arisen since the disclosure document 
was lodged; and 
ii. would have been required by section 710, 
711, 712, 713, 714 or 715 to be included 
in the disclosure document if it had 
arisen before the disclosure document 
was lodged.34 
 
Civil liability is imposed under section 729 by providing that: 
 
A person who suffers loss or damage because an offer of 
securities under a disclosure document contravenes 
subsection 728(1) may recover the amount of the loss or 
damage from a person referred to in the following table 
if the loss or damage is one that the table makes the 
person liable for. This is so even if the person did not 
commit, and was not involved in, the contravention.35 
 
The relevant components of civil liability for misstatements under 
 
 33. BAXT, BLACK & HANRAHAN, supra note 29, at 166. 
 34. Corporations Act, § 728(1) (2001) (Austl.). 
 35. Id. § 729(1). 
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the Aust. Act are discussed in further detail below.36 
C. New Zealand 
(1) General requirement for disclosure 
In its early stages, New Zealand’s regulation of securities was largely 
characterized by what has been termed the “uncritical adoption of United 
Kingdom legislation.”37 This lasted for more than half a century, until 
1955, when the Companies Act 1955 increased the amount of 
information required to be disclosed in a prospectus.38  For the next 
twenty or so years, New Zealand’s legislation was piecemeal and took a 
reactive stance towards raising capital.39 
The catalyst for reform of New Zealand’s securities regulation came 
in the 1970s, when there were various financial collapses, most notably 
the collapse of Securitibank.40 The New Zealand Securities Act of 1978 
(N.Z. Act) prohibits offering securities to the public unless the offer is 
made by way of a prospectus or an investment statement.41 The 
regulation of securities in New Zealand was previously entity-based, and 
the N.Z. Act therefore marked a reversal in New Zealand securities 
law.42 
The N.Z. Act, together with the Securities Regulations 1983, 
prescribes the information that must be disclosed.43 For investment 
statements, the information answers key questions ranging from “What 
sort of investment is this?” to “What are my risks?”44 The legislation is 
therefore prescriptive in its approach. This prescriptive approach is 
supplemented by the requirement for directors to state in the prospectus 
that there are no material matters other than those already disclosed.45 
An extensive review of New Zealand’s securities legislation began in 
 
 36. See infra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 37. Lindroos & Walker, supra note 1, at 59–89, 60. 
 38. Id. at 59–89, 68. 
 39. Id. at 59–89, 59, 68. 
 40. Id. at 59–89, 71–72. 
 41. New Zealand Securities Act, § 33 (1978). There is also the ability to make an offer 
pursuant to an advertisement that is not an investment statement. 
 42. Cathy Quinn & Peter Ratner, Introduction to New Zealand Securities Law, in CHARLES 
MORISON, MORISON'S COMPANY AND SECURITIES LAW (LexisNexis 2004 reissue). 
 43. In effect, the N.Z. Act only came into force in 1983, when the Securities Regulations 1983 
was introduced. 
 44. Securities Regulations 1983 (N.Z.), sched. 3D. 
 45. Id. sched. 1, clause 40. In practice, investors do not read or review prospectuses but rely 
mainly on the investment statement. 
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2002. This brought about the introduction of new securities legislation 
and regulations and the amendment of the existing securities legislation, 
including the N.Z. Act.46 These amendments increased the size and 
range of penalties and remedies available and gave greater flexibility to 
the New Zealand Securities Commission (NZSC). The New Zealand 
securities regulations continue to be reviewed on an ongoing basis. 
(2) Imposition of civil liability for misstatements 
Civil liability for misstatements in offer documents is imposed under 
the N.Z. Act when there is a “civil liability event” that includes the 
distribution of an advertisement or a registered prospectus that contains 
an untrue statement.47 An “advertisement” is specifically defined to 
include an investment statement,48 which, being specifically designed for 
laypersons, is the document most often read by investors. 
Section 55(a) of the N.Z. Act deems a statement to be untrue if: 
(a)it is misleading in the form and context in which 
it is provided; or 
(b)it is misleading by reason of the omission of a 
particular which is material to the statement in the form 
and context in which it is included. 
 
Where there is a civil liability event, the court has the ability to 
provide two possible remedies.49 First, on application by the NZSC, the 
court may make a pecuniary penalty order and a declaration of civil 
liability.50 Second, the court may, on the application of the NZSC or a 
subscriber, order 
 
a liable person to pay compensation to all or any of the 
persons who subscribed for any securities on the faith of 
an advertisement or registered prospectus that includes 
an untrue statement, for the loss or damage that the 
persons have sustained by reason of the untrue 
statement.51 
 
 46. The Securities Markets Act 2006, the Securities Markets (Substantial Security Holders) 
Regulations 2007, and the Securities Markets (Investment Advisers and Brokers) Regulations 2007 
were introduced, and amendments were made to the Takeovers Act, the Companies Act, the Fair 
Trading Act, and the N.Z. Act. 
 47. New Zealand Securities Act, § 55B(a) (1978). 
 48. Id. § 2A(2)(b). 
 49. Id. § 55A(1). 
 50. Id. § 55C. 
 51. Id. § 55G. 
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The relevant components of civil liability for misstatements in offer 
documents under the N.Z. Act are discussed in further detail below.52 
 
D. Comparison and Critique 
In reviewing legislation imposing liability for misstatements in offer 
documents, two issues stand out. The first issue is the relevance of the 
tests of materiality, causation, and reliance, including whether each test 
should be used. The second issue is whether there should be liability for 
misstatements where securities are purchased on the secondary market 
(as opposed to directly from the issuer). 
(1) The relevance of materiality, causation, and reliance 
The materiality test can be an important element in examining 
misstatements even though it is not generally required by statute. The 
only jurisdiction that has a statutory materiality requirement is New 
Zealand, and even then the materiality test exists only with respect to 
omissions and not inclusions.53 In contrast, the United Kingdom and 
Australia impose liability for omissions only where required matters are 
not included, without any reference to materiality.54 
This difference is perhaps a reflection of the principle-based 
approach used in the United Kingdom and Australia, as opposed to the 
prescriptive approach used in New Zealand. The principle-based 
approach relies on an assumption that the information necessary to allow 
investors to make informed assessments inherently includes a materiality 
test. Under this approach, an explicit statutory materiality requirement is 
not necessary. In contrast, under the prescriptive approach, the prescribed 
information is assumed to be material. The prescriptive approach, 
however, can be under-inclusive, in that information not prescribed may 
nevertheless be material. Thus, a specific materiality requirement is 
necessary to capture information that would not otherwise fall within the 
prescribed information. 
In determining whether an omission is material, New Zealand courts 
focus on investor perceptions. The leading case is Coleman v. Myers, 
where Judge Cooke described the test as “those considerations which can 
 
 52. See infra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 53. This can be compared to the imposition of criminal liability in New Zealand, under which 
there is a defence if it is proved that the statement was immaterial. See New Zealand Securities Act, 
§ 58 (1978). 
 54. See Financial Services and Markets Act (2000) (U.K.); see also Corporations Act (2001) 
(Austl.). 
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reasonably be said, in the particular case, to be likely materially to affect 
the mind of a vendor or of a purchaser.”55 This suggests that while 
material information does not need to actually or solely determine the 
outcome of an investor’s decision, it must at least be information that 
investors would take into account in making their decision. The relevant 
perspective in this analysis is that of the reasonable investor, not of any 
actual investor. 
A materiality analysis, however, must look beyond statutory 
provisions. Thus, while neither the U.K. Act nor the Aust. Act expressly 
refers to materiality, the concept is implied in the provisions and, since 
the Directors Liability Act 1890, has become a cornerstone of the 
imposition of civil liability for misstatements.56 Common law has long 
held that inclusions must be material in order to be misleading or 
untrue.57 Similarly, omissions must be material to render the statements 
misleading.58 Some suggest, at least with respect to the U.K. Act, that 
materiality continues to be required for both inclusions and omissions, 
despite the absence of precise words to that effect.59 This view leads to 
some uncertainty regarding the N.Z. Act, as it then becomes unclear 
whether the materiality requirement applies to inclusions, even though 
the statute does not so state. 
The requirement of materiality under the Aust. Act is somewhat 
more obscure. The predecessor to the Aust. Act, the Australian 
Corporations Law, prohibited the issue of a prospectus if the false or 
misleading statement or omission was material, the statement was true, 
or the omission was inadvertent.60 This applied to both civil liability and 
criminal liability. The Aust. Act, however, contains a materiality 
requirement for criminal liability only—i.e., criminal liability is imposed 
if the misleading or deceptive statement or omission is materially adverse 
to an investor.61 The difference in tests for civil liability and criminal 
liability would appear to indicate that the inclusion of a materiality 
requirement must have some effect. Yet, if the common law method is to 
imply a requirement of materiality in any event, it is unclear whether the 
 
 55. Coleman v. Myers, [1977] N.Z.L.R. 225 (N.Z.S.C. & C.A.). 
 56. Greg Golding, The Reform of Misstatement Liability in Australia's Prospectus Laws, 
Univ. of Sydney 148, 152 (Dec. 31, 2001), available at 
http://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/handle/2123/607. 
 57. See Danneberg & Knapp P.C. v. Jarahis, No. 99-11690 (11th Cir. July 16, 2002), 
available at http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/199911690.opn.pdf. 
 58. Id. 
 59. HUDSON, supra note 16, at 592. 
 60. Corporations Law, § 996 (1989) (Austl.). 
 61. Corporations Act, § 728(3) (2001) (Austl.). 
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difference in statutory tests for civil liability and criminal liability is of 
any significance. 
Regarding the removal of the materiality requirement for civil 
liability, the Explanatory Memorandum to the CLERP Bill provided:62 
 
It will no longer be necessary in civil actions under the 
Law to establish that the misleading or deceptive 
statement, omission or new matter was material. . . . 
However in place of a materiality element, recovery of 
damages will depend on establishing that the loss has 
been suffered as a result of the misleading or deceptive 
statement, omission or new matter.63 
 
The shift in the test of liability from one of materiality to one of 
causation is somewhat curious, but certainly not novel. Beginning in the 
late 1800s and early 1900s, courts merged the concepts of materiality and 
reliance. For example, in De La Cour v. Clinton the court stated: 
 
I hold this misstatement not to have been material or, in 
other words, that the plaintiffs have not sustained any 
loss or damage by reason of this untrue or inaccurate 
statement in the prospectus. 64 
 
In effect, the court first objectively determines whether the 
misstatement is material, and if it is, the court presumes reliance unless 
the person responsible for the misstatement can prove otherwise.65 In 
other words, a material misstatement apparently justifies an inference 
that the inclusion or omission influenced the person to invest.66 This two 
step test appears to be used regardless of the words of the particular 
legislation governing the materiality of misstatements. 
Such an interpretation in case law raises the question of whether it is 
even necessary to include a legislative requirement for materiality. 
Further confusion results when the concept of materiality is present in 
relation to omissions but not in relation to inclusions, as in New Zealand, 
 
 62. Explanatory  Memorandum to CLERP Bill, para. 8.29 (1999). 
 63. The same implication is found in section 55F(2) of the N.Z. Act, which requires the court 
to have regard to all relevant matters (including, among other things, the nature and extent of the 
civil liability event and the damage to the integrity or reputation of New Zealand's securities 
markets) in determining an appropriate pecuniary penalty. 
 64.  (1904) 20 T.L.R. 421 (U.K.). 
 65. Arnison v. Smith, (1889) 41 Ch. D. 348 (C.A.) (U.K). 
 66. Smith v. Chadwick, (1884) 9 App. Cas. 187 (H.L.) (U.K.). 
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or when the concept of materiality is present in relation to criminal but 
not civil liability, as in both Australia and New Zealand. Thus, in these 
uncertain circumstances a strong argument exists that statutory 
enactments have implicitly overruled the common law position. 
If materiality is not included as a statutory test, what about causation 
or reliance? As set out above, the U.K. Act simply stipulates that the 
claimant must have suffered loss “as a result” of the misstatement. It is 
not clear whether this means the claimant must prove that the misleading 
statement caused them to invest, or whether the mere fact that there has 
been a misstatement is sufficient for action to be brought under section 
90 of the U.K. Act.67 If the former is required, then the test appears to 
morph into one of reliance. However, if the person was fully aware of the 
misstatement and its defective nature but nevertheless acquired the 
securities, then it is unlikely that the person suffered the loss “as a result 
of” the misstatement.68 
The U.K. Act lacks any statutory requirement that the claimant rely 
on the misstatement. It is generally accepted that this does not require the 
purchaser to have read or relied on the particular misstatement, or even 
to have been aware of its existence.69 All that seems to be required is that 
the misstatement affects the price of the security. This standard of 
causation or foreseeability is not as high as the standard ordinarily 
required in tort. Rather, it is a weak causation requirement, i.e. the loss 
must be “a result of” the misleading statement. Positive non-reliance is, 
however, a defence to liability.70 
On its face, the Aust. Act also does not contain a statutory 
requirement of reliance. It simply requires a causal link between the loss 
or damage and the contravention of section 728.71 Nevertheless, some 
suggest that this seems to require proof that the claimant’s loss arose 
from the conduct of the person responsible, not simply proof that the 
misstatement would matter to a hypothetical investor.72 Once again, if 
this is accepted, then the statutory requirement for causation morphs into 
proof of individual reliance by the particular claimant. Australian courts 
have held that reliance can be inferred from the relevant circumstances73 
 
 67. HUDSON, supra note 16, at 592. 
 68. Id. at 578–79. 
 69. Paul Davies, Davies Review of Issuer Liability—Liability for misstatements to the 
market: A discussion paper by Professor Paul Davies QC, para. 27 (Mar. 2007) (unpublished paper, 
on file with author). 
 70. Financial Services and Markets Act, sched. 10A, para. 6 (2000) (U.K.). 
 71. Corporations Act, § 729 (2001) (Austl.). 
 72. BAXT, BLACK & HANRAHAN, supra note 29, at 257, 334. 
 73. Gould v. Vaggelas, (1985) 157 C.L.R. 215 (C.A.) (Austl.). 
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or, in some cases, indirectly.74 
The uncertainty in the statutory tests contained in the U.K. Act and 
the Aust. Act is unhelpful. In comparison, the N.Z. Act is clear, albeit 
narrow, in its approach. Civil liability under the N.Z. Act is imposed 
where the claimant has subscribed for securities “on the faith of” a 
prospectus or advertisement that includes an untrue statement.75 Some 
suggest that faith does not need to be placed on the misstatement itself 
but merely on the prospectus or advertisement,76 although this contention 
is debatable.77 
Assuming that faith need only be placed on the document and not on 
the particular misstatement, the claimant must at least show that it 
received or saw the prospectus or advertisement prior to subscription.78 
In practice, investors seldom view registered prospectuses. However, 
issuers are required to provide investors with a copy of the investment 
statement (which is included in the definition of “advertisement”) prior 
to subscription of the securities, so this requirement is easily satisfied 
with respect to investment statements/advertisements.79 To some extent 
this reveals some mismatch in the difficulty of bringing a successful 
claim regarding an investment statement as opposed to a prospectus. 
The N.Z. Act also contains the element of causation. The claimant is 
required to show that the misstatement led an investor to act, resulting in 
loss or damage.80 Like the U.K. Act and the Aust. Act, the test of 
causation seems to morph into reliance. This is discussed in more detail 
below. 
Of the three jurisdictions, establishing civil liability seems to be the 
most difficult in the New Zealand system. This could be the reason that 
few civil proceedings are undertaken by potential claimants for 
misstatements in New Zealand. This conclusion is difficult to make, 
however, as no cases have been undertaken in the United Kingdom 
either. This issue is discussed in further detail below.81 Having a weak 
civil liability regime is not desirable, as it raises too many barriers to 
 
 74. See Janssen-Cilag Pty Ltd. v. Pfizer Pty Ltd., (1992) 37 F.C.R. 526, 529–30 (Austl.); 
Hampic Pty. Ltd. v. Adams, [1999] N.S.W.C.A. 455 (Austl.); Stockland Pty. Ltd. v. Retail Design 
Group Pty. Ltd., [2003] N.S.W.C.A. 84 (Austl.). 
 75. New Zealand Securities Act, § 55G (1978). 
 76. BROOKERS SECURITIES LAW SE55G.01 (Supp. 2009). 
 77. See infra Section II.D.a. 
 78. BROOKERS SECURITIES LAW SE55G.01 (Supp. 2009). 
 79. New Zealand Securities Act, § 2 (1978). 
 80. Id. § 55G. 
 81. See infra note 171 and accompanying text. 
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enforcement, thus reducing the credibility of the capital market.82 
In addition to the three jurisdictions discussed above, it may be 
beneficial to mention a fourth jurisdiction, the United States. Section 11 
of the United States Securities Act of 193383 (U.S. Act) imposes liability 
for a registration statement that “contain[s] an untrue statement of a 
material fact or omit[s] to state a material fact required to be stated 
therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading.”84 
Similarly, section 12 of the U.S. Act imposes liability for a prospectus or 
oral offer for the sale of securities that contains a material misstatement 
or material omission.85 
The U.S. Act clearly requires materiality regardless of whether the 
misstatement is an inclusion or an omission.86 Furthermore, proof of 
actual reliance on the material misstatement is not required.87 Due to the 
strong focus on materiality in the United States, authoritative case law 
has developed outlining the test for materiality in securities transactions: 
if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would 
consider the matter in question important in making the investment 
decision, that matter is material.88 
The different methods that the various jurisdictions have adopted in 
order to attach liability for misstatements boil down to one question: 
what is the relevance of having a materiality, reliance or causation 
threshold? This question is perhaps best answered as follows: some 
filtering device is necessary to sift the worthy cases from those that are 
purely opportunistic.89 
But the question remains of which filtering device creates the most 
appropriate balance between investor protection and issuer autonomy. 
The recent case of Houghton v. Saunders provides an example of the 
operation of the reliance and causation tests in New Zealand.90 
 
 82. Angie Zandstra, Jason Harris & Anil Hargovan, Widening the net: Accessorial liability for 
continuous disclosure contraventions, 22 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 51 (2008). 
 83. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1933). 
 84. New Zealand Securities Act, § 11(1) (1978). 
 85. United States Securities Act, § 12(a)(2) (1933). 
 86. See generally Securities Act of 1933. 
 87. John H. Mathias, Directors and Officers Liability: Prevention, Insurance and 
Indemnification, LAW J. PRESS, 2000, at 3.16, 3.20. 
 88. TNZSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445 (1976). 
 89. Krista L. Turnquist, Note: Pleading Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 98 
MICH. L. REV. 2395 (2000). 
 90. [2009] N.Z.C.C.L.R. 13 (H.C.), aff’d, Houghton v. Saunders, [2009] N.Z.C.A. 610 (C.A.). 
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a) Houghton v. Saunders 
Houghton v. Saunders was an interlocutory appeal brought in the 
New Zealand High Court.91 The defendants requested the court to 
dismiss certain causes of action and to review and rescind orders given 
by the lower court. In May 2004, Feltex Carpets Limited (Feltex) sold its 
shares by way of initial public offering. Feltex registered a prospectus, 
which projected net profit after tax for the year ending June 2005 as 
$23.9 million. 
On March 31, 2005, less than a year after the offering, Feltex 
announced a downgrading of the profit forecast to $15–$16 million. By 
March 2006, the value of the shares had declined from $1.70 per share, 
the initial purchase price, to $0.60 per share. Feltex went into liquidation 
in December 2006, by which time all shareholder equity disappeared and 
creditors had claims approximating $30–$40 million. 
An October 2007 Securities Commission inquiry found that the 
prospectus was not materially misleading and that the Securities 
Commission would not take any further action with regard to the 
prospectus.92 
Houghton initiated proceedings and represented shareholders that 
had purchased shares in the initial public offering (IPO Shareholders), 
and Jones represented shareholders that had purchased shares 
subsequently on the secondary market (Post-IPO Shareholders). The 
claims were brought against five groups of people, including the former 
directors of Feltex and the promoter of the IPO. The claims were for 
breach of the N.Z. Act (on the basis that the prospectus contained untrue 
statements) tortious negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of 
the Fair Trading Act. 
The court considered the issue of reliance in relation to each of the 
claims. The plaintiffs accepted that the words “on the faith of” in section 
56 of the N.Z. Act imported an element of actual reliance.93 However, 
they argued that the reliance need only be placed on the registered 
prospectus (as opposed to the particular untrue statement in the 
prospectus). In response to this argument, Justice French stated: 
 
Section 56 also specifically requires the loss or damage 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. Securities Commission Feltex Carpets Limited – IPO Prospectus, Financial Reporting 
and Continuous Disclosure (Oct. 13 2007), available at http://www.sec-
com.govt.nz/publications/documents/feltex/. 
 93. Houghton, [2009] N.Z.C.C.L.R. 13, para. 114 (H.C.). 
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must have been sustained “by reason of the untrue 
statement.” It does not say by reason of the prospectus. 
On the face of it, the wording would seem necessarily to 
require actual reliance on the untrue statement itself.94 
 
Justice French also stated that in the context of section 56, “reliance 
bears on causation.”95 These statements show that the test of reliance 
seems to morph into causation. Justice French then stated: 
 
My conclusion on the claim under the Securities Act as 
pleaded is that it will require proof of actual reliance on 
the alleged untrue statements. This will of necessity vary 
from individual to individual, and means the necessary 
commonality of interest to justify a representative action 
is lacking.96 
 
Thus, as shown in Houghton v. Saunders, New Zealand—one of the 
weakest civil liability regimes—weighs the difficult use of actual 
reliance and its relationship with causation as the main filtering device to 
strike the right balance between investor protection and issuer autonomy. 
However, as described in further detail below, heavy use of the reliance 
factor as a filtering device for alleged untrue statements is an issue for 
concern. 
b) Materiality and causation as the filtering device 
Houghton v. Saunders demonstrates that the requirement for reliance 
on the untrue statement itself is an overwhelming obstacle to bringing a 
claim under the N.Z. Act. Offer documents are lengthy documents and 
often run into hundreds of pages. Despite attempts made by various 
jurisdictions, including Australia and New Zealand, to simplify offer 
documents, they remain difficult to read and understand even for 
 
 94. Id. at para. 115 (citing Murray v. Morel & Co Ltd [2007] 3 NZLR 721 at paras [89] and 
[107]) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). On appeal to the New Zealand Court of Appeal, Justice 
Baragwanath noted that while “the clause ‘all persons who subscribe for any securities on the faith 
of a prospectus’ may refer to reliance generally on the prospectus rather than specific passages or 
figures,” the courts have nevertheless narrowed the actual application of section 56 to “specific 
reliance” upon “specific language of the audit report and underlying accounts.” Id. at para. 85. He 
further noted that in this case, the Court of Appeal did not “propose to determine at this stage the 
scope of reliance required.” Id. at para. 86. 
 95. Id. at para. 113. 
 96. Id. at para. 119. 
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reasonably knowledgeable investors.97 This difficulty is even more 
pronounced when the offer has a complex structure, which is not 
uncommon. 
This subsection will analyze Justice French’s discussion on actual 
reliance and illustrate how requiring reliance brings additional obstacles 
and negative impacts on the civil action process. First, requiring reliance 
on the untrue statement is unrealistic due to the potentially excessive 
length of an offer document. Second, a reliance requirement would stifle 
class actions and harm those investors who did suffer a loss but did not 
read the entire document to sufficiently rely on a particular misstatement. 
Third, this subsection will also show how several countries have begun 
to do away with the requirement of reliance because of its unrealistic 
requirements and harmful effects. Furthermore, this subsection will also 
explore the necessity and efficacy of the filtering devices of materiality 
and causation. 
Under Justice French’s analysis, it is practically impossible to bring a 
case using a class action. Even if a class action procedure were regulated, 
proof of actual reliance by each claimant would still need to exist, 
thereby seriously limiting the possibility of class action. Thus, Justice 
French’s analysis ignores the operation of the capital market in practice. 
Furthermore, it is unrealistic to expect private individuals to expressly 
rely on offer documents in making decisions to invest.98 Rather, it is 
more common for “the herd” to essentially free ride on the reliance of 
financial advisers and brokers who do read and rely on offer 
documents.99 Justice French’s reasoning would deny relief to all of these 
investors and eliminate class actions ab initio. 
Additionally, if investors do not read an offer document, it is difficult 
for them to argue that they relied upon a particular untrue statement in 
the offer document. Reliance upon a particular statement sets an 
extremely high standard, as many investors would be excluded from 
relief even though they may have suffered loss. Their reliance may have 
been on the reputation of the issuer or on other representations in the 
offer documents that were not technically untrue. However, in such a 
case there is no policy reason for refusing relief.100 
Due to the negative effects of requiring reliance, many jurisdictions 
 
 97. Donovan W. M. Waters, A Canadian Looks at the Investment Product and Adviser 
Disclosure Law, 3 N.Z. BUS. L.Q. 160, 187 (1997). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 171. 
 100. See, e.g., 2 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 527 
(3d ed. 1995). 
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have done away with the requirement. Canada, for example, amended the 
Ontario Securities Act in 2002 to remove the reliance requirement101 in 
response to perceived deficiencies in the common law, which required 
actual reliance on the misrepresentation.102 In Canada, a shareholder 
seeking to advance a claim need not establish that they were influenced 
by, or were even aware of, the misrepresentation. 
Furthermore, in the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada, the 
courts have taken the position that where a representation is intended to 
induce a party to enter a contract, a presumption of reliance on the 
representation may arise as an inference of fact, though not as an 
inference of law.103 Thus, if the reliance requirement were removed, this 
inference of fact would no longer be required and would assist in 
simplifying the law. 
Removing reliance as an initial filtering device does not necessarily 
introduce a fraud on the market theory. The fraud on the market theory 
assumes that share prices in an efficient market reflect all information 
available about the shares, which ostensibly includes misstatements.104 
As shareholders rely on the integrity of the market price, reliance does 
not need to be proved.105 This theory has so far been limited to the 
United States in the context of the specific regulatory context there. 
However, the theory has been rejected in New Zealand106 and 
Australia.107 
Furthermore, it is also important to note that the discussion on 
removing the requirement for reliance thus far has been limited to the 
purchase of securities directly from the issuer through an offer document. 
In these cases, the link between the purchase and the loss is so strong that 
it is not unreasonable to presume reliance. However, whether reliance is 
required for secondary market purchases is a separate issue that is 
considered below.108 
Despite Justice French’s analysis, fewer courts and statutes are 
requiring reliance to prove misrepresentation because it is a burdensome 
 
 101. Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. ch. 5 § 130 (1990). 
 102. See Carom v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd., [1998] 41 O.R. (3d) 780 (Can.). 
 103. Smith v. Chadwick, (1884) 9 App. Cas. 187 (H.L.) (U.K.); Gould v. Vaggelas, (1985) 157 
C.L.R. 215 (Austl.); Carom v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd, [1998] 41 O.R. (3d) 780, para. 34 (Can.). 
 104. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 
J. FIN. 383 (1970). 
 105. Michael J. Legg, Shareholder Class Actions in Australia—The Perfect Storm?  31(3) 
U.N.S.W. L. J. 669 (2008). 
 106. Boyd Knight v. Purdue, [1999] 2 N.Z.L.R. 278 (C.A.), para.55. 
 107. Johnston v. McGrath, (2007) N.S.W.C.A. 231, paras. 37–38 (Austl.). 
 108. See infra note 121. 
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filtering device as shown in Houghton v. Saunders, it is unrealistic, and 
also because the general public does read entire offer documents.109 
Although there is a movement away from requiring reliance on the 
misrepresented material in an offer document, there are still two other 
filtering devices: materiality and causation. Thus, the issue turns on (1) 
whether the tests of materiality and causation are necessary even if 
reliance is removed, and (2) whether using a dual test of materiality and 
causation or a single test would be most effective. 
It appears that even when the relevant legislation contains no 
filtering device the courts have, as a matter of practicality, implied a 
materiality threshold110 or a causation and reliance threshold.111 In the 
United States, however, even though there is no requirement of causation 
or reliance, the threshold of materiality appears strong enough to act as 
the sole filtering device.112 
Applying a single materiality threshold does have its advantages. It 
simplifies the relevant legislation, provides sufficient flexibility for the 
courts to reach better outcomes, and removes impediments to 
recovery.113 Other difficulties can be addressed by using specific 
remedies and by making adjustments to whether personal liability or only 
corporate liability is imposed. As a matter of perception it seems unjust 
to hold the defendant liable, essentially on a strict liability basis, if the 
misstatement has not caused the claimant’s loss. It seems that the United 
Kingdom’s approach of a weak requirement for causation with no 
requirement for reliance is likely a very effective test.114 
Despite the foregoing, there are benefits to having a materiality 
threshold, which could serve as the primary test. Because the threshold 
requirement of materiality is already present under common law and in 
any event may be implied by the courts,115 for clarity it should be 
explicitly referred to in legislation. For the same reason and for 
consistency, the legislative threshold should also apply across the board, 
as opposed to only omissions or only criminal liability. 
Additionally, some have suggested that a definition of materiality 
should be introduced into legislation.116 However, because materiality is 
 
 109. Corporations Act, §728 (2001) (Austl.); Financial Services and Markets Act, § 90 (2000) 
(U.K.). 
 110. See, e.g., Cackett v. Keswick, [1902] 2 Ch. 456 (U.K.). 
 111. See, e.g., Smith v. Chadwick, (1884) 9 App. Cas. 187 (H.L.) (U.K.). 
 112. United States Securities Act, §§ 11 & 12 (1933). 
 113. Golding, supra note 56, at 148, 152. 
 114. Financial Services and Markets Act, § 90 (2000) (U.K.). 
 115. See, e.g., Cackett v. Keswick, [1902] 2 Ch. 456 (U.K.). 
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generally a question of fact,117 this issue seems to be one that the courts 
are apt at addressing and the courts should therefore have the discretion 
and flexibility to determine this on a case-by-case basis. As materiality is 
an important factor in the United States test, the United States cases may 
be a useful reference in applying the test. There is general agreement 
about how materiality is determined—something is material if it could, 
individually or collectively, reasonably be expected to influence the 
decisions of investors.118 Additionally, reference could be made to 
generally accepted accounting practices, which also contain a test of 
materiality.119 
(2) Liability for purchases on the secondary market 
The next issue is whether liability for misstatements should be 
imposed when the purchase was made on the secondary market, or in 
other words, not purchased directly from the issuer, and, if so, whether 
reliance is required for liability to attach. This subsection will analyze the 
scope of liability by first looking at the more narrow legislation in New 
Zealand and comparing that to the broader legislation in the United 
Kingdom, as well as the recommendations of appointed Securities groups 
in Australia regarding secondary market purchases. Then this subsection 
will address the possible benefits and effects of extending the scope of 
redressability to include secondary market purchasers and of including 
the use of reliance or a presumption of reliance in that determination. 
In the United Kingdom, the use of the term “acquired” makes it clear 
that even persons who purchase securities on the secondary market are 
eligible for relief if the other requirements of section 90 of the U.K. Act 
are met.120 This is in contrast with the traditional common law view that 
only persons subscribing under a prospectus have recourse for 
misstatements in the prospectus. For example, in Peek v. Gurney the 
House of Lords held that the object of a prospectus was to provide 
investors with the necessary information to make informed decisions 
about whether to accept the offer to invest under the prospectus, not to 
make market purchases.121 This was the same approach statutorily 
 
 117. 1 HAZEN, supra note 100, at 377. 
 118. 2 HAZEN, supra note 100, at 506–26. 
 119. John Blakemore & Brian Pain, Materiality in Accounting, ACCA, May 1, 1998,  
http://www.accaglobal.com/archive/sa_oldarticles/37159; see, e.g., INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS BOARD, IAS 36: IMPAIRMENT OF ASSETS. 
 120. Financial Services and Markets Act, § 90(a) (2000) (U.K.). 
 121. (1873) 6 L.R. 377 (H.L.) (U.K.); see also Scott v. Dixon, (1859) 29 LJ Ex 620 (Q.B.) 
(U.K.). 
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adopted under the Directors Liability Act 1890, which only attached 
liability when persons subscribed for or purchased securities on the faith 
of a prospectus. This purpose was taken to mean that no statutory remedy 
was available for purchases on the secondary market.122 
In contrast, in New Zealand legislation reflects the traditional 
common law and statutory approach, attaching liability only when 
persons have “subscribed” for securities on the faith of the prospectus.123 
The use of the term “subscribe” prima facie indicates that only persons 
that have in fact subscribed for securities directly from the issuer under 
the offer document are eligible for relief.124 This is the case even if the 
secondary market purchaser purchased the relevant securities from the 
original subscriber immediately after the initial public offering. 
Similarly, a secondary market purchaser who relied on a particular 
misstatement in the offer documents before purchasing is denied relief. 
Black’s Law Dictionary perhaps best illustrates the distinction between 
an acquisition and a subscription: the definition of “acquire” is “to gain 
possession or control of; to get or obtain,” and the definition of 
“subscription” is “a written contract to purchase newly issued shares of 
stock or bonds.”125 
The N.Z. Act defines “subscribe” to include “purchase and 
contribute to, whether by way of cash or otherwise.”126 The use of the 
word “purchase” within the definition introduces some uncertainty as to 
whether purchases on the secondary market are eligible for relief. 
However, it is settled that subscription can occur when an application 
form is returned by an investor together with the relevant subscription 
money.127 This restricts the application of the N.Z. Act to the primary 
market. 
Furthermore, that the N.Z. Act is designed to regulate the primary 
securities market is corroborated by section 6 of the N.Z. Act, which 
provides that the civil liability provisions do not apply to “a security that 
has previously been allotted.”128 “Allot” is defined to include sell, issue, 
assign and convey.129 Despite the foregoing, there is, however, some 
 
 122. Possfund Custodian Trustee Ltd v. Diamond, (1996) 2 All E.R. 774, 781–82. 
 123. New Zealand Securities Act, § 55G (1978). 
 124. Id. § 2. 
 125. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (Bryan A. Garner, ed., Thomson West 8th ed. 2004) 
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 127. DFC Financial Services Ltd. v. Abel, [1991] 2 N.Z.L.R. 619, 626; see also BROOKERS 
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scope for the N.Z. Act to apply to the secondary market. Section 6(2) of 
the N.Z. Act provides that the relevant provisions apply to a previously 
allotted security if it was originally allotted with a view to its being 
offered for sale to the public in New Zealand and has not previously been 
offered for sale to the public in New Zealand. A security is deemed to be 
allotted, with respect to being offered for sale to the public, when the 
security is offered to the public within six months of the allotment and 
has not been fully paid for at the time the offer was made.130 Although 
this provision appears to leave open the possibility of the securities 
regulations applying to the secondary market, in practical terms the gap 
is extremely narrow. The provision is limited to situations where the 
securities have not previously been offered for sale to the public. Thus, it 
will not catch situations where the securities have been offered to the 
public, purchased by a member of the public, and then sold to a third 
party, even if the sale occurs immediately after the original subscription. 
The N.Z. Act is therefore still largely limited to purchases made on the 
primary market. 
In Australia, however, the legislative provisions reflect a different 
approach. The Australian provisions do not make reference to either an 
acquisition or a subscription, focusing instead on causation and 
reliance.131 This is a somewhat uncertain approach, as it cannot be said 
determinatively whether claimants who purchase securities on the 
secondary market are eligible for relief. At its edges this approach 
becomes the same approach as that adopted by the United Kingdom, in 
which there is a weak causation requirement. Although it is clear under 
the United Kingdom provisions that a claimant who purchased securities 
on the secondary market may be eligible for relief, the claim will not 
survive if the misstatement is so removed from the loss that causation is 
too tenuous.132 
In the mid 1980s, the Australian National Companies & Securities 
Commissioner established the Securities Information Review Committee 
(SIRC) to provide advice on the then-current law. SIRC released a report 
in 1987.133 One of the key recommendations made by the SIRC report 
was that subscribers should be presumed to have invested on the faith of 
the prospectus or, in other words, to have relied on the prospectus. With 
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respect to secondary market purchases, the Committee suggested that a 
fair balance could exist by limiting the right to compensation to 
purchases made within six months of the issue of the prospectus, 
requiring the claimant to establish that they invested by relying on the 
prospectus and excluding the defendant from liability if it can establish 
that it was unreasonable for the claimant to rely on the prospectus.134 
Thus, this effectively imposes a presumption of reliance if the purchase 
was made within six months of the issue of the prospectus.135 The SIRC 
recommendation did not eventuate when the Aust. Act was enacted. 
However, it seems that this recommendation is a sound one. 
The tenuous reliance requirement in secondary or distanced 
purchases is also illustrated in case law. As found in Houghton v. 
Saunders, the issue of whether the Post-IPO Shareholders had subscribed 
for securities was not raised. Nonetheless, the Post-IPO Shareholders 
were excluded from relief by the operation of the reliance test. The IPO 
Shareholders alleged that they had a claim under section 56 of the N.Z. 
Act as they had relied on the registered prospectus. It was said that this 
argument clearly could not apply to the Post-IPO Shareholders (although 
practically speaking it is possible that a Post-IPO Shareholder could have 
also read and relied on the registered prospectus prior to making a 
purchase on the secondary market).136 Therefore, alternative pleadings 
were raised by the claimants that the untrue statements affected the share 
price reflected by the books or that the untrue statements had the effect 
of disguising the availability of a statutory remedy under the N.Z. Act; 
however, these were held to be inapplicable to the Post-IPO 
Shareholders.137 
Enlarging the group of possible claimants to persons who simply 
acquire securities—not just persons who subscribe—and removing the 
test of reliance would mean that secondary market purchasers would be 
able to bring a claim. This may be desirable as a misstatement might 
cause secondary market purchasers loss or damage even though they may 
not have viewed or read the offer document. For example, in Houghton 
v. Saunders, the Post-IPO Shareholders suffered loss from the drastic 
decrease in the share price brought about by the inaccurate net profit 
forecast in the prospectus. Furthermore, it is also possible that Post-IPO 
Shareholders may in fact have read and relied on offer documents. 
Such an approach is essentially the United Kingdom’s approach, 
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which requires only that the misstatement affect the price of the 
security.138 However, despite the benefits of such an approach, the result 
seems to be an extremely broad test which adds pressure on the test of 
causation and does not adequately limit liability to genuine cases. 
Furthermore, because any number of market factors may affect the price 
of a security, it is extremely difficult to attribute a difference in the price 
of a security to a particular misstatement, making the test nearly 
impossible to apply. 
As mentioned above, with respect to secondary market purchasers, 
the SIRC recommendation to have a rebuttable presumption is a sound 
one. Imposing a straight test of reliance seems too narrow, while doing 
away with reliance seems too broad. Thus, the midpoint would be a 
rebuttable presumption of reliance. It is reasonable to expect that 
secondary market purchasers who acquire their securities within a short 
time period after the initial offer of securities would have had reference 
to the offer documents. They can therefore be presumed to have relied on 
the offer documents. As they are only secondary market purchasers, this 
should only be a presumption. The issuer may then prove otherwise. 
In summary, the various ways countries deal with secondary market 
purchasers is useful in determining a more effective method. The New 
Zealand approach of attaching liability only where the claimant has 
subscribed for securities is extremely narrow. This is especially so in the 
modern era, where trading on the secondary market is much more 
widespread than initial subscriptions for securities. On the other hand, 
the United Kingdom’s approach of allowing relief to all claimants who 
have acquired securities adds unnecessary pressure on the test of 
causation and may cast the net too wide. Thus, secondary market 
purchasers should be given the ability to bring a claim for loss or damage 
caused by misstatements, but only if they have relied on the offer 
documents and can prove it. For purchasers who acquire their securities 
within a short time period of the registration of the offer documents (e.g., 
six months), this test can take the form of a rebuttable presumption of 
reliance. 
III. WHO IS CIVILLY LIABLE FOR MISSTATEMENTS IN OFFER 
DOCUMENTS? 
There is some variance among the jurisdictions in the key classes of 
persons held liable for misstatements in offer documents. The two 
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classes of persons that will be discussed in this paper are issuers and 
directors. With respect to the former, liability is generally strict and 
inescapable. However, where the issuer is a corporate entity, holding the 
entity liable in practice means penalizing shareholders. Therefore, the 
issue is whether such corporate entities should be held liable. With 
respect to directors, it is accepted that directors should be held liable, but 
the issue is whether this has any deterrent effect given the increasing 
significance of director and officer indemnity insurance (D&O 
insurance). 
A. Should Issuers Be Held Liable? 
One issue that stands out from the comparison of the jurisdictions is 
whether issuers should be held liable for misstatements. The common 
initial response to this is that they should be liable since the issuer is the 
party offering the securities and receiving money for the securities. 
Additionally, as the party responsible for the offer documents in the first 
place, the issuer should bear the liability for any misstatements therein. 
However, where the issuer is a corporation and the only securities 
concerned are shares, seeking recourse from the issuer may not always 
be the fairest or most beneficial solution. The issuer is only a creation of 
statute, and holding a corporate issuer liable usually affects the 
shareholders the most, who are not themselves responsible for the 
misstatement. The situation differs if both debt securities and equity 
securities are involved, as there may then be a transfer in value from debt 
holders to shareholders or vice versa. 
Where only shares are involved, holding a corporate issuer liable for 
misstatements has a number of consequences. First, if found liable, the 
issuer may be required to pay a monetary penalty (because corporate 
issuers cannot be imprisoned) and/or compensation to the affected 
claimants. If at the time the penalty and/or compensation payment is 
made the claimant still holds shares in the issuer and the issuer is solvent, 
the claimant is essentially paying to be recompensed. If the claimant no 
longer holds shares in the issuer, then the current shareholders will 
effectively be bearing the cost of compensating the earlier shareholders. 
If the issuer is no longer solvent, then the issuer will not have the ability 
to pay compensation and the shareholders will instead have to seek 
recourse elsewhere, for example from directors or insurers.139 
Second, the threat of litigation and the potential for a misstatement in 
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the offer documents are both likely to cause the price of the issuer’s 
shares to drop further. This exacerbates the situation described above. 
The cost of the litigation will also be paid for by the issuer, which again 
essentially means that this cost is borne by shareholders. 
Third, from a non-monetary perspective, the potential misstatement 
will affect the issuer’s reputation in the marketplace. This may have 
repercussions for the issuer’s dealings with third parties and may affect 
the issuer’s ability to issue new shares should the need to raise further 
capital arise. The issuer’s reliability with respect to continuous disclosure 
requirements may also be questioned. While on its face this is an 
inevitable consequence of a misstatement or potential misstatement, the 
shareholders still must bear the cost. 
With respect to the first issue, New Zealand’s provisions provide the 
best solution. The issuer is liable only if the issuer is an individual. If the 
issuer is a corporation, then other persons, including the directors of the 
issuer,140 are held liable for the misstatement.141 As issuers nowadays 
are rarely individuals, this effectively means that individual issuers are 
not typically held responsible for misstatements. This can be compared 
to the United Kingdom’s position, which holds the issuer liable 
regardless of whether the issuer is an individual or a corporation.142 
With respect to the second and third issues, a decline in the issuer’s 
share price as well as the negative effect on the issuer’s reputation in the 
market place will occur whenever there is an alleged misstatement, 
regardless of whether the issuer is held liable. These consequences also 
arise in every situation where a corporation is held responsible for 
wrongdoing, for example, in violations of health and safety or 
environmental regulations.143 However, in the context of misstatements, 
taking the first step of not holding issuers liable to pay penalties or 
compensation would go some way towards decreasing circularity and 
striking a balance in issuer liability.144 
Where the offeror is not the issuer, the United Kingdom’s provision 
also holds the offeror of the securities liable for the misstatement.145 This 
is roughly equivalent to the Australian provision, which does not refer to 
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the issuer, but simply holds the person making the offer liable.146 This is 
also true of the New Zealand position, which defines “issuer” to include 
the offeror of the security.147 The offeror is not the issuer where the 
securities are purchased on the secondary market. However, because of 
the limited application of the N.Z. Act to primary market transactions, 
the inclusion of offerors in the definition of “issuer” does not help to 
extend its application to the secondary market.148 
The terms “offeror” and “person making the offer” are not defined in 
any of the jurisdictions. Needless to say, the terms are broader than the 
term “issuer,” and as drafted would seem to encompass any vendor, even 
if the vendor had no part to play in the initial issue of the securities or the 
preparation of the prospectus.149 This approach does not seem entirely 
rational, as it is difficult to draw a line of causation between an unrelated 
third party individual who sells his or her securities on a listed exchange 
and a loss suffered by the purchaser from a misstatement in the offer 
document. 
However, the United Kingdom places a limitation on the liability of 
an offeror that is not the issuer. The United Kingdom’s regulations limit 
the liability of an offeror that is not the issuer where the prospectus was 
drawn up primarily by the issuer and the offeror makes the offer in 
association with the issuer.150 However, this limitation is hardly 
sufficient, as the offeror is only protected if it makes the offer in 
association with the issuer, which will not be the case where the offeror 
is an unrelated third party individual.151 
The United Kingdom and Australian provisions would benefit from 
increased limits on the liability of offerors. For example, an offeror 
should be held liable only if the offeror was involved in the preparation 
of the offer document. The same recommendation would be made if New 
Zealand were to expand its legislation to deal more broadly with 
purchases on the secondary market. Ensuring that civil liability is 
adequately restricted will prevent high quality issuers from leaving the 
capital markets and provide incentives for issuers generally to comply 
with the securities regulations. It will also ensure that adverse selection 
does not occur. 
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B. The Effect of Holding Directors Liable for Misstatements 
If issuers are not liable for misstatements, then the alternative is to 
hold the directors of the issuer liable. The directors are, after all, the 
controlling mind and body of the issuer and are the individuals behind 
the offer of securities. This subsection will discuss the central issue that 
arises in the context of directors: whether holding directors liable for 
misstatements has any effect given the emergence of director protection 
devices such as exculpatory provisions and D&O insurance. This 
subsection also considers the balance between, in Senator Sherry’s 
words, “promoting accountability and ensuring suitable people are 
willing to serve as directors and take appropriate business risks.”152 
There are subtle differences between the scope of the provisions 
holding directors, proposed directors, and persons represented to be 
directors liable in each of the jurisdictions. For example, in Australia 
each director is liable by virtue of his position as director, whereas in 
New Zealand only persons who have signed a prospectus as director or 
on whose behalf the prospectus has been signed are liable.153 In effect, in 
all three jurisdictions persons who are directors of the issuer when the 
offer documents are published or securities are issued are held liable.154 
Additionally, persons who authorise themselves or have consented to be 
named in the offer documents as a proposed director and have been 
named as such are also held liable.155 
In recent years, the growing prominence of directors’ duties and 
liabilities has led to the increasing significance of indemnification rights 
and insurance protection for directors.156 While it is generally accepted 
that in order to prevent corporate failure and protect the integrity of the 
market there needs to be adequate regulation of directors, it is now also 
generally accepted that in order to attract and retain skilled personnel, 
companies must offer protection to directors, such as exculpatory 
protection and D&O insurance.157 
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Before agreeing to be directors, potential directors now typically 
request that exculpatory and indemnification provisions be provided by 
the company.158 However, there may be prohibitions on the provision of 
indemnities by a company in certain circumstances. For example, under 
the Aust. Act a company may not indemnify against liability incurred by 
a director when it is liability of the company or liability to a third party 
that arose out of bad faith.159 Indemnity may not be provided for legal 
costs in defending proceedings in which the director is found to have a 
liability or in defending criminal proceedings in which the director is 
found guilty.160 
In the United Kingdom, although indemnification may be provided 
by a company, D&O insurance is still vital in certain circumstances. 
Indemnification often includes claims brought by persons who purchase 
shares in the company based on alleged misstatements.161 However, in 
line with the Australian position, no indemnity may be given for 
defending criminal proceedings in which the director is convicted or civil 
proceedings brought by the company where judgment is given against 
the director.162 Thus, in these circumstances, D&O insurance becomes 
crucial. 
However, although D&O insurance is widely available in many 
countries, including the United Kingdom and Australia, and likely 
increasingly so in New Zealand, there are also some profound 
limitations. There are a number of standard exclusions from D&O 
insurance policies, including exclusions for liability stemming from 
misstatements in offer documents.163 While separate insurance coverage 
could be purchased with respect to such liability, it is extremely 
expensive and may not be justified. In addition, there are increasing gaps 
between the scope of indemnities provided by companies, the extent of 
D&O insurance coverage, and the liabilities for which directors expect to 
be indemnified.164 
Given the current status, it appears that holding directors liable for 
misstatements in offer documents does correctly focus directors on the 
importance of ensuring that offer documents are entirely accurate and not 
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misleading. Directors cannot take their responsibilities lightly with 
respect to offer documents when they may not be indemnified or fully 
covered by D&O insurance. Even if they have some level of protection, 
the uncertainty involved in bringing a claim under a deed of indemnity or 
the insurance policy still provides some incentive for directors to take 
their duties seriously. 
To the extent that a company provides a device to protect directors 
from liability, there is an element of circularity involved in holding 
directors liable for misstatements. This is similar to the circularity 
involved in holding the issuer liable165 in that the company (and 
therefore indirectly the shareholders) pays for the insurance or is required 
to indemnify directors under the indemnity. In the context of directors, 
however, this is simply the cost of attracting and retaining skilled 
directors. Furthermore, the level of protection provided by a company to 
directors is dependent on individual negotiations. 
In the last few years there has been increasing debate, especially in 
the Australian context, as to whether securities regulation is imposing too 
much of a burden on directors.166 This has been said to result in suitable 
persons being reluctant to be directors. Securities regulation was 
originally used to promote and encourage the stability of the financial 
market, but excessive regulation makes directors overly risk-averse, to 
the detriment of economic growth.167 Over-regulation “limits the scope 
for innovation, undermines entrepreneurial drive and reduce[s] 
productivity and competition.”168 Over-regulation also leads to adverse 
selection, as high-quality issuers have means of raising funds outside of 
the capital market (for example by wholesale issue), leaving only low-
quality issuers left in the capital market. 
Regulation needs to be appropriately targeted to balance 
accountability and entrepreneurialism.169 This balance needs to exist 
wherever directors’ duties and liabilities are concerned. Specifically, in 
the context of misstatements in offer documents, holding directors liable 
is crucial to deterring undesirable conduct and providing some form of 
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redress for persons affected by the misstatement. Since the inclusion of 
directors in the list of “responsible persons” is non-negotiable, the valve 
can be regulated by having appropriate defences.170 
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF MISSTATEMENTS: DO THE REGIMES WORK? 
It is difficult to know, looking only at the relevant legislative 
provisions, whether these provisions are working effectively to strike the 
right balance in providing an adequate level of investor protection. One 
way to answer this question is to analyse the cases that have (or have not) 
been brought before the courts. However, cases bringing action for 
misstatements in offer documents are unfortunately lacking, especially in 
the United Kingdom and New Zealand. Australia has had more activity 
in this field, but this seems to be attributed to the structural accessibility 
of the courts, such as the ability to bring class actions and the use of 
litigation funding, rather than to the breadth of the provisions imposing 
liability for misstatements.171 
Because the effectiveness of the regimes hinges so much on their 
structure, this section considers whether the structure of the regimes in 
the three jurisdictions enables misstatements to be adequately policed. 
The enforcement of accurate offer documents is best seen as a broad 
concept that encompasses not just claims addressed in court for 
misstatements in published offer documents, but also ex ante 
enforcement undertaken by regulators and advisers prior to publication. 
A number of methods of enforcement are considered below, followed by 
a discussion of how to strike the right balance in the level of 
enforcement. 
A. Ex Ante Enforcement by Public Authorities 
In the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, offer 
documents must be lodged with the relevant authorities before the 
commencement of the offering, which include the Financial Services 
Authority (UKFSA), the Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission (ASIC) and the Registrar of Companies (NZRC), 
respectively. Already at this early stage there is a divergence in the level 
 
 170. While the issue of defenses is not discussed in this article, in broad terms the available 
defenses in each jurisdiction seem to align with the ease with which liability is imposed for 
misstatements. For example, the test for liability in New Zealand has a high threshold, and the 
available defenses are correspondingly narrow. In the United Kingdom and Australia it is easier for 
liability to attach, but also easier to establish a defense. 
 171. Legg, supra note 105, at 669. 
SPRING 2010  Civil Liability 
83 
 
of oversight and enforcement activity undertaken by each of the 
authorities. 
In the United Kingdom, section 87A of the U.K. Act places the 
responsibility of approving a prospectus in the hands of the UKFSA. The 
UKFSA is not able to approve a prospectus unless it is satisfied that, 
among other things, the prospectus contains the necessary information 
and is compliant with all the other requirements.172 In Australia, offer 
documents lodged with the ASIC are not pre-vetted by the ASIC, 
although compliance reviews are carried out selectively.173 
In New Zealand, the NZRC’s role is primarily that of record keeper 
and policer of formal issues. This role is separate from that of the NZSC, 
which is the body that may cancel or suspend the registration of a 
prospectus (including when the prospectus contains a misstatement).174 
The NZRC may refuse the registration of a prospectus if it contains a 
misstatement, but the NZRC does not generally investigate the truth of 
particular statements.175 In practice, the NZRC conducts a pre-
registration review of prospectuses to determine if they are suitable for 
registration approval.176 
In none of the countries does registration or lodgement of offer 
documents guarantee that the documents comply with the relevant 
securities regulation provisions. However, the relevant authorities carry 
out varying degrees of oversight and vetting. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that United Kingdom and New Zealand authorities appear to be 
more stringent than Australian authorities.177 
B. Ex Post Facto Enforcement by Public Authorities 
In terms of ex post facto enforcement, where an alleged misstatement 
is brought to the attention of the regulatory bodies, the regulatory bodies 
can generally stop the offering from proceeding if defects are discovered 
in offer documents. For example, the ASIC may extend the period for 
which applications cannot be accepted by the issuer (this is known as the 
“exposure period”) as well as issue interim or final stop orders.178 The 
NZSC can suspend or cancel offer documents, remove them from the 
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market, and publicize these actions.179 
Where an offering has proceeded without the intervention of the 
regulatory bodies and a misstatement is subsequently alleged, the 
regulatory bodies may conduct a review of the offer documents. 
Typically a report is then issued on whether a breach of the relevant 
statutory provisions has occurred. Because this review and reporting 
process may be time consuming, a substantial period of time may elapse 
from when the misstatement is first alleged to when a case is brought. 
If the regulatory bodies determine that the offer documents do 
contain a misstatement, the UKFSA, ASIC, and NZSC may bring a civil 
case or refer the case to criminal proceedings. However, as discussed 
above, few cases on misstatements have been brought before the courts. 
The UKFSA in particular has historically been known to be light-handed 
in its approach,180 although in recent times this appears to be 
changing.181 In Australia, the ASIC is reluctant to bring civil 
proceedings where potential private plaintiffs have sufficient funds to do 
so themselves.182 
Under the N.Z. Act, the NZSC is specifically and exclusively 
empowered to make an application to the Court for a pecuniary penalty 
order or a declaration of civil liability.183 Section 55D of the N.Z. Act 
provides that the purpose of the declaration of civil liability is to allow a 
claimant (which may be the NZSC or a subscriber) to rely on the 
declaration in proceedings for compensation. The declaration of civil 
liability is conclusive regarding the liability of the person and the 
conduct constituting the event, and the claimant is therefore not required 
to prove the civil liability event.184 
This feature of New Zealand’s securities regulation is rather unique. 
It provides a link between public and private enforcement that is not 
available in the other jurisdictions. This increases the accessibility of the 
courts to private individuals, as the cost and effort involved in bringing a 
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claim may otherwise be prohibitive. With a declaration of civil liability, 
private individuals may rely on the enforcement actions taken by the 
public authorities and, in effect, piggyback on those enforcement actions. 
However, this only works if the public enforcement authority adequately 
polices and enforces misstatements, which in New Zealand’s case is 
highly debatable.185 
C.Private Enforcement and Shareholder Class Actions 
The alternative to public enforcement of wrongdoing is private 
enforcement. However, it is unusual for an individual claimant to bring a 
case, as the costs and time involved are likely to be prohibitive. 
Furthermore: 
 
The isolated individual inevitably lacks sufficient 
motivation, information and power to initiate and pursue 
litigation against the powerful producer. Even if such an 
unlikely event should occur, the result would be wholly 
inadequate to discourage the mass-wrongdoer from 
continuing the profitable damaging activities; the 
individual plaintiff would be the “owner” of an 
insignificant fragment of the damage involved.186 
 
If the case is strong and the amount of the claim is substantial, it may 
be worthwhile for an institutional investor to bring the case.187 Then, if 
the institutional investor is successful, this can provide opportunities for 
other individual investors to also bring separate claims. 
As individual claims are unlikely and unviable, the shareholder class 
action has emerged as another mechanism of private enforcement of 
good corporate governance.188 Shareholder class action involves one 
shareholder bringing a claim on behalf of other shareholders who have 
the same claim against the same defendant.189 Shareholder class actions 
offer economies of scale which are not otherwise available. 
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Shareholder class actions have long been prevalent in the United 
States, but are now a fast-growing phenomenon in Australia.190 The 
reduction of costs, the introduction of financing, and the increased 
prospects of success are also said to be converging and leading to greater 
litigation of shareholder claims.191 
Investor actions and class actions have not gained similar momentum 
in the United Kingdom or New Zealand.192 One significant reason for 
this is the lack of an opt-out procedure in these jurisdictions. In an opt-
out procedure, the class of persons bringing the claim is described 
inclusively. This means that persons who come within the description are 
included as part of the class and will be bound by the judgment unless 
they take steps not to be.193 In contrast, an opt-in procedure requires each 
person who wishes to be part of the proceedings to take affirmative steps 
to be included in the class.194 
In the United Kingdom, investor actions may be brought under the 
group litigation order regime, which operates on an opt-in basis. 
However, no cases involving misstatements in offer documents have 
been brought using the regime.195 In New Zealand, attempts have 
recently been made to bring proceedings using an opt-out procedure, but 
these attempts have proven unsuccessful thus far.196 
In Houghton v. Saunders, representative orders were given by 
Associate Judge Faire and allowing the proceedings to be on an opt-out 
basis. This meant that both the IPO Shareholders and the Post-IPO 
Shareholders would automatically be part of the proceedings unless they 
gave notice to be excluded. These orders were challenged by the 
defendants in the High Court. 
On the appropriateness of the opt-out procedure, Justice French 
found that the “notion [that] someone can become a party to a court 
proceeding without their consent is somewhat alien to our way of 
thinking.”197 While an opt-out procedure was relatively common in other 
jurisdictions including Australia, the New Zealand High Court Rules do 
not contain any provisions allowing an opt-out procedure. In the absence 
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of legislative change, Justice French found that the opt-out procedure had 
to be replaced with an opt-in procedure.198 
The opt-out procedure is seen as “the hallmark of the class 
action.”199 In the United States, the opt-out procedure was introduced in 
1966, leading to an increase in class action activity.200 In Australia, class 
actions by an opt-out procedure have been available in the Federal Court 
since 1992 and in Victoria since 2000, although they are not available in 
other states.201 
The opt-out procedure helps provide protection to consumers and to 
the market by reducing the cost of court proceedings and enhancing 
access to legal remedies for individuals. Unwilling and vulnerable 
individuals are grouped into the class by default, increasing the opt-out 
procedure’s access to justice and promoting the efficient use of court 
resources.202 The opt-out procedure also ensures consistency amongst 
cases with common issues and increases the enforceability and 
effectiveness of the law.203 
Opponents of the opt-out procedure criticize the class action for 
including in the class individuals who do not wish to litigate and those 
who are indifferent. However, various means have been adopted to allow 
individuals who oppose bringing suit to be excluded from the class, such 
as repetitive opt-out rights at different stages of the litigation and detailed 
notice requirements explaining the opt-out rights.204 Indeed, it is crucial 
that the opt-out procedure captures the indifferent and those who might 
otherwise be dissuaded from bringing suit by various social, 
psychological, or economic barriers, as this will prevent under-
compensation.205 
The opt-out procedure should be seriously considered in the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand. Justice French in Houghton v. Saunders 
sums it up well: 
 
Having regard to developments in other jurisdictions, it 
is highly likely claims of the type brought in this 
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proceeding will become increasingly common in New 
Zealand. No doubt it is that consideration which has 
prompted the Rules Committee to seek to introduce new 
class action Rules. Such claims pose new challenges for 
the Courts, and the Court must be ready to accommodate 
them as best it can.206 
D. Private Enforcement and Litigation Funding 
Another aspect that affects the amount of private enforcement is how 
the litigation is funded. Historically, the funding of litigation by third 
parties gave rise to the torts of maintenance and champerty.207 
Maintenance involves a person (called a maintainor) providing others 
with funding to enable them to undertake litigation. If the maintainor is 
able to interfere or direct the course of the litigation and is entitled to 
share in the proceeds if the outcome is successful, then champerty 
exists.208 
For reasons of public policy, mainly the prevention of abuse of court 
process for personal gain, many viewed maintenance and champerty 
negatively. However, there exists the public policy of facilitating access 
to justice, which makes it desirable for third parties to provide financial 
assistance to enable claimants to have the benefit of legal 
representation.209 
Litigation funding involves a contract between a funding entity and 
the claimants. Under the agreement the funder pays the costs of the 
litigation if the case fails.210 In common law jurisdictions where the 
losing party is liable for the winning party’s costs,211 the funder also 
agrees to pay the other party’s costs if the case fails. If the case succeeds, 
then the funder receives a percentage of the proceeds and is usually 
reimbursed for costs. 
The legality of litigation funding was considered for the first time in 
Australia in Campbells Cash and Carry Pty. Ltd. v. Fostif Pty. Ltd.212 
The High Court found that litigation funding was not an abuse of process 
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or contrary to public policy. The joint judgment of Judges Gummow, 
Hayne, and Brennan did not impose a blanket bar on litigation funding 
and stated that fears of funders conducting themselves in a way that was 
detrimental to the administration of justice could be addressed by 
existing doctrines of abuse of process.213 
Campbells Cash and Carry was cited in Houghton v. Saunders, 
where the defendants accepted that a merely champertous arrangement 
would be insufficient and that something more than maintenance and 
profit sharing would be required before the arrangement could constitute 
an abuse of process.214 In determining whether abuse of process existed, 
the court considered various factors, including whether the funder stood 
to gain an excessive or disproportionate profit, whether the funder had no 
genuine commercial interest in the cause of action, and whether the 
funder was only seeking to resolve the dispute to make a profit.215 Given 
the scale and complexity of the claim, the court found that the litigation 
funding arrangement did not amount to an abuse of process warranting a 
stay.216 
Litigation funding promotes access to justice, improves efficiency, 
and spreads the risk of complex litigation.217 The availability of 
litigation funding promotes shareholder class actions by providing 
necessary resources, like time and money, that individuals may not 
otherwise have. Funders also have incentives to monitor disclosures in 
offer documents and elsewhere to identify possible causes of action.218 
This enhances investor protection and encourages issuers to provide 
accurate and sufficient disclosure. 
E. Striking the Right Balance 
The rise of shareholder class actions and litigation funding has 
contributed to increased policing of issuers by what has been termed the 
“private attorney-general.”219 On one hand this may be beneficial by 
keeping issuers in check. On the other hand, there are strong concerns 
that jurisdictions should not move towards a litigation culture that 
pervades securities regulation, such as in the United States.220 Already in 
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Australia the convergence of class actions, reduced costs, improved 
prospects of success in litigation, and a shift towards a consumerism 
mindset that is quick to blame may be causing the perfect storm.221 
Given the stronger emphasis on public enforcement in the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand, this phenomenon has yet to arrive in these 
jurisdictions.222 New Zealand’s legislation provides a good balance 
between public and private enforcement by allowing private enforcement 
to piggyback on public enforcement and preventing an overlap between 
the two. However, private enforcement under this arrangement is highly 
dependent on the effectiveness of the public enforcement authority, 
which at present is highly questionable in New Zealand and is only in its 
infancy in the United Kingdom.223 
As capital markets and securities regulation continue to develop, 
demographics will play an important role in the level of enforcement 
demanded by the public. As the baby boomers near retirement age and 
start investing larger sums of money in the capital market, it is likely that 
mismanagement and misstatements will become less tolerable. Some will 
call for tougher sanctions and increased enforcement. Securities 
regulation will inevitably have to keep up with these trends, including 
providing for class actions and allowing the use of an opt-out procedure. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is not easy to strike the right balance in securities regulation. This 
is the case not only in designing the rules that hold persons liable for 
misstatements in prospectuses, but also in the rules that enable potential 
claimants to bring causes of action against liable persons. Both over-
enforcement and under-enforcement can have a damaging effect on the 
capital market. In each case a balance needs to exist between investor 
protection and the freedom of issuers and management to make 
decisions. Factors such as discouraging excessive litigation and 
maintaining the integrity of the market are also important considerations 
for these issues. 
Each of the three jurisdictions has different means of striking the 
right balance. For example, New Zealand has a narrow test for the 
imposition of liability for misstatements, but this is balanced by a broad 
class of persons being held liable for misstatements and narrow defences 
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available to those persons. In the United Kingdom and Australia, it is 
much easier for liability to attach, but this is balanced by the fact that it is 
also easier to establish a defence. 
In terms of enforcement, it is possible to go too far but it is also 
possible to not go far enough, as arguably was the case in the United 
Kingdom a number of years ago. While suggestions can be made as to 
how the law could improve, each approach requires analysis in the 
context of the overarching policies and market conditions in each 
jurisdiction. 
It is not necessary or even desirable to have both a stringent civil 
liability regime and a strong enforcement regime. Having both, as the 
United States does, can lead to excessive litigation. However, having 
both is better than having a relaxed civil liability threshold combined 
with a weak enforcement regime, as New Zealand arguably does. 
Perhaps it is most important to keep a close watch on the issue, for 
without deliberate and methodical action it is unlikely that the right 
balance will exist. 
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